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Abstract
The amalgamation of Medical Internet of Things
(MIoT) devices into everyday life is influencing the
landscape of modern medicine. The implementation of
these devices potentially alleviates the pressures and
physical demands of healthcare systems through the
remote monitoring of patients. However, there are
concerns that the emergence of MIoT ecosystems is
introducing an assortment of security and privacy
challenges. While previous research has shown that
multiple vulnerabilities exist within MIoT devices,
minimal research investigates potential data leakage
from MIoT devices through hijacking attacks.
The research contribution of this paper is twofold.
First, it provides a proof of concept that certain MIoT
devices and their accompanying smartphone
applications are vulnerable to hijacking attacks.
Second, it highlights the effectiveness of using digital
forensics tools as a lens to identify patient and medical
device information on a hijacker’s smartphone.

1. Introduction
The integration of wireless communication
capabilities is dramatically influencing the landscape
of modern medicine. This evolution is introducing
medical devices that will operate more efficiently,
safely, and securely over wireless networks [1]. Recent
studies by the European Commission and IBM
estimate that within the next decade, over 50 billion
medical devices will be Internet capable [2, 3].
Coupling this information with industry predictions
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indicating that 49% of individuals own a wearable
device, supports the idea that individuals are
increasingly interested in monitoring their health,
medical, and dietary practices [4, 5].
While Medical Internet of Things (MIoT) devices
are often for personal use, they are also useful in larger
medical environments [6]. Within hospitals, these
devices can record and collect patient data and
integrate these measurements into Electronic Health
Records (EHRs). Hence, both individual and hospital
MIoT devices potentially produce and collect vast
amounts of medical and patient information. For
example, an Internet-enabled next-generation ventilator
is expected to generate almost 305 data parameters per
second [7, 8]. As a result of these predictions, a
Stanford Medicine report goes on to estimate that the
medical industry will generate 2,314 exabytes of data
by 2020 [9].
However, this data explosion in medical
environments also introduces an assortment of security
and privacy challenges, from both industry and
academic perspectives. Patient information, therapy
details, and device operation metadata generated and
collected by MIoT devices are all considered to be
private information according to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
[10]. As a result, the Security and Privacy Rules within
HIPAA specify that entities “maintain appropriate
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for
protecting electronic Patient Health Information
(ePHI)” [11, 12]. HIPAA additionally states that
entities are required to “preserve the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of collected ePHI data, as
well as protecting against malicious users and
unauthorized disclosures” [10].
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Many MIoT devices also interface to a smartphone
application. This application allows users to track
personal and medical information communications
with a MIoT device. However, previous research
demonstrates that smartphones and their accompanying
applications can contain user-related residual data [1317]. From the perspective of a medical device, research
indicates that smartphone residual data can be used to
identify metadata related to a specific patient and their
interactions with the medical device itself [18]. Further
complicating matters, researchers have established that
residual artifacts generated by smartphone applications
can be used to identify broad user behavior
patterns [19].
Current research also indicates that medical devices
are susceptible to cleartext network transmissions,
often without leaving a trace [20, 21]. The marriage of
smartphone applications with MIoT devices, coupled
with both the growing volume of data and the
identified security and privacy concerns prompts the
idea that these devices are vulnerable to hijacking
attacks. This idea prompted the hypothesis that MIoT
devices are susceptive to hijacking attacks, through
their accompanying smartphone applications. This
hypothesis also raises the following supplementary
research questions:
• Does a hijacking attack generate recoverable
residual data?
• If so, is it possible to recover MIoT device
readings from a hijacking attack involving the
device?
• If residual data does exist, is it possible for an
attacker to identify a specific individual using
information from a hijacking attack?
The contribution of this research is twofold. First, it
provides a proof of concept that certain MIoT devices
and their accompanying smartphone applications are
vulnerable to hijacking attacks. Second, it highlights
the effectiveness of using digital forensics tools as a
lens to identify patient and medical device information
on a hijacker’s smartphone. The balance of the paper is
structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work,
and Section 3 presents the methodology employed in
this research. Section 4 presents the results and a
discussion of these results. Section 5 derives
conclusions and presents ideas for future research.

Related Work
The continuous integration of technology in
medical settings is creating an environment where
medical devices are potentially at risk from a security
perspective [22]. Complicating matters, research
indicates that residual data from mobile and GPS

devices are used in civil and criminal legal contexts
and that there are legal issues around conducting cloud
investigations [23-25]. The potential critical impact on
human life, coupled with legal implications,
encourages discussions by researchers on the security
implications
of
technology
in
hospital
environments [26-28]. Malasri and Wang [26] argue
that implantable medical devices, such as pacemakers,
are susceptible to a variety of attacks, including
eavesdropping, patient tracking, and spoofing. For
example, an individual could send malicious
commands to compromise the security of a pacemaker,
causing direct physical harm to an individual [26].
Glisson et al. [27] demonstrate how a medical
mannequin, within a hospital environment, could be
vulnerable to denial of service and brute force attacks.
Li et al. [28] focus their research on diabetes therapy
devices. These researchers argue that some devices
transmit patient and device information in plaintext,
including passwords and dosage information.
The emergence of Medical Internet of Things
(MIoT) ecosystems is expected to introduce several
benefits and opportunities for the medical and
healthcare communities [29-33]. MIoT devices are
defined as “a group of devices connected to the
Internet, to perform the processes and services required
to support healthcare” [34]. Baker et al. [29] claim that
MIoT devices provide a potential solution that
alleviates pressures and physical demands on
healthcare systems through the remote monitoring of
patients. For instance, MIoT devices could monitor
patients in remote and rural areas, as well as elderly
patients, from the comfort of their home [29].
Dimitrov [31] contends that deploying MIoT
devices to patients allows medical practitioners to
provide personalized and customized treatment plans.
Separately, medical researchers contend that providing
anxious patients with MIoT devices, for home use,
could provide more accurate and reliable medical
results [30, 32, 33].
While the benefits of deploying MIoT devices are
clear, there are concerns that patient and medical
information could be vulnerable to attack by malicious
users. This concern is particularly true when MIoT
devices are used in environments where it is difficult to
control the underlying network, such as a public Wi-Fi
hotspot [34]. Williams and McCauley [35] add that
because MIoT devices collect large amounts of
personal and health information, these devices are
more likely to be targeted by malicious users and
cybercriminals. The collection of vast amounts of data
introduces the threat of cross-linking information and
subsequently using this information to draw
conclusions about a patient [35]. Hence, several
researchers have focused their efforts on examining the
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security and privacy challenges that emerge from the
deployment of MIoT devices in both hospital and
home settings [20, 21, 36-39].
Lotfy and Hale [38] studied the data exchange
mechanisms used within various health wearable
devices, from a security perspective. The focus of the
study was to investigate the Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) pairing strategies in three devices, a Jawbone, a
Pebble Watch, and a Fitbit. Their results show that
while manufacturers claim that their pairing strategies
are secure, vulnerabilities exist that could result in
man-in-the-middle attacks.
Fereidooni et al. [37] focused their efforts on the
security of seventeen fitness tracking products. Their
attack focuses on the data exchanged between the
fitness tracker’s smartphone applications and the
manufacturer's cloud service. These researchers
successfully demonstrated how a malicious user could
inject fabricated data into spoofed medical activity
records [37].
Alisgari et al. [36] examined security weaknesses in
mobile health smartphone applications, which are often
used together with MIoT devices. This analysis
investigated the use of the Transport Layer Security
protocol in twenty-five mobile health applications.
Alisgari et al. [36] reported that twenty-one out of the
twenty-five applications were susceptible to man-inthe-middle attacks. Moreover, the results of the
analysis revealed that twelve applications leaked the
user password during network transmissions.
Wood et al. [20] investigated an attacker’s ability to
intercept MIoT data transmissions, and to then use this
information to build a profile of the user. This analysis
focused on analyzing network packets transmitted by
four MIoT devices. The results showed that
information captured from one of the devices included
sensitive user information, which would allow an
attacker to determine not just that the user measured
their blood pressure, but also how frequently the user
was taking these measurements. While the packet
analysis does not identify individual names, a unique
user identifier was recognized during the analysis of
the packet transmission [20].
Classen et al. [21] analyzed the entire Fitbit ecosystem, including its smartphone application, the Fitbit
cloud, and the Fitbit’s device firmware. Through their
analysis of these technologies, Classen et al. [21]
explained that multiple vulnerabilities exist, which
could impact a user’s privacy and the security of their
information. To mitigate these concerns, Classen et al.
[21] suggested that Fitbit implement security by design
principles and stronger encryption on the smartphone
application.
Siddiqi et al. [39] focused on timestamps and their
vulnerability to modification in MIoT devices. The

authors demonstrated how an attacker could,
potentially, intercept and modify medical and patient
information, before it is stored in the cloud. This
includes timestamp information, which would allow an
attacker to backfill medical data and commit insurance
fraud [39]. While previous research has examined a
variety of security vulnerabilities in MIoT devices,
minimal research investigates the ability for an
individual to undertake a hijacking attack using a
smartphone application and its corresponding MIoT
device.

3. Experiment Design
To investigate the hypothesis and associated
research questions identified in the introduction, a
controlled experiment was conducted as described by
Oates [40]. The controlled experiment consisted of
eight stages. The eight stages included: 1) preparing
the victim smartphones, installing the Medical Internet
of Things (MIoT) device smartphone applications, as
well as creating test accounts for use in the experiment;
2) synchronizing the MIoT devices with the victim
smartphones and then powering down these
smartphones; 3) using the MIoT devices; 4) preparing
a hijacker smartphone device, installing the MIoT
device smartphone applications and setting up a test
account; 5) executing the MIoT smartphone
applications on the hijacker smartphone and attempting
to obtain offline readings from the MIoT devices; 6)
conducting a manual examination of the hijacker
smartphone; 7) processing the hijacker smartphone
using MicroSystemation (MSAB) XRY to create an
extraction dump; 8) using forensic tools to extract files
and artifacts from the extraction dump.
The smartphones utilized in this experiment include
a Samsung Galaxy S6 and an Apple iPhone SE
(hereafter referred to as the victim smartphones) and a
Samsung Galaxy S4 (hereafter referred to as the
hijacker smartphone). Table 1 - Smartphone Devices
presents an overview of these devices, their features,
and storage capabilities.
Feature
Model
Number
Operating
System
Storage
Capacity

Galaxy
S4

Galaxy
S6

iPhone
SE

SGH-i337

SM-G920P

A1662

Android
v. 5.0

Android
v. 7.0

iOS
v. 11.4.1

16 GB

32 GB

32 GB

Table 1: Smartphone Devices
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The victim smartphones were selected based on the
operating systems executed on the devices. The
Android and iOS operating systems represent the two
most popular smartphone operating systems at the time
of the research [41]. The hijacker smartphone was
selected based on its compatibility with the XRY
forensic toolkit, which was used to extract a memory
dump of the device’s internal memory. Several
smartphones could have been used to fulfill these
criteria and could have been used in the research. The
decision to use these specific devices was based on
author availability.
The Medical Internet of Things (MIoT) devices
used in this experiment includes an iHealth Smart
glucometer, an iHealth Air oximeter, and a Nokia
Body scale. Table 2 - MIoT Devices, presents an
overview of these devices, their model numbers, and
firmware versions. These devices were selected based
on two reasons. First, all three MIoT devices include
both an Android and iOS smartphone application,
which can be executed on the victim and hijacker
smartphones. Second, each MIoT device can store
offline readings, when the user’s smartphone
application is not available to ‘push’ the results to the
smartphone interface. The MIoT devices include a
specific smartphone application. For the glucometer,
the application used was Gluco-Smart (v. 4.7 on both
Android and iOS), for the oximeter, the application
used was MyVitals (Android v. 3.8.1 and iOS v. 3.8),
and for the scale, the application used was Health Mate
(Android v. 3.5.4 and iOS v. 4.0.1).
Device Name
Smart
Glucometer
Air Oximeter
Body Scale

Model Number

2.

3.

4.

Firmware

BG5

V. 6.0.0

PO3M
03700546702341

V. 2.1.4
V. 1751

Table 2: MIoT Devices
In preparation for the experiment, the victim and
hijacker smartphones were ‘hard reset’ to remove any
previous data. The purpose of the hard reset is to
restore the factory settings on smartphones. Depending
on the smartphone, either a Google or Apple account
was then created on the smartphone to complete the
initial setup. All default setup options were selected
during this process. The following steps were then
undertaken during the experiment, which involved the
victim smartphones, the MIoT devices, and the
hijacker smartphone:
1. The victim smartphones were connected to a local
wireless network for the experiment. This wireless
network was used to access the Internet. Using the
victim smartphone’s respective application store
(i.e., Google Play and the Apple App Store), the

5.

MIoT smartphone applications were downloaded
and installed on each of the victim smartphones.
The default installation and security parameters
were used to install the smartphone applications.
The MIoT smartphone applications were executed
on each victim smartphone, and test profile
accounts were created for the experiment. These
profile accounts used test information to complete a
user profile, which included: first name, last name,
date of birth, gender, and email address fields.
Default settings were used to complete the profile
creation on all three MIoT applications.
After setting up each MIoT smartphone application,
the user interface was used to ‘pair’ the victim
smartphone with the corresponding MIoT device.
This involved using the respective smartphone
application to ‘search’ for the corresponding MIoT
device. After the device was found, the application
interface provided steps to confirm the ‘pairing’ of
the MIoT devices with the victim smartphones. At
this point, the smartphone applications were ‘ready’
to receive device readings from the MIoT devices.
Both victim smartphones were then powered down.
Each MIoT device was then used once a day for six
days. The first three days involved undertaking
readings using the device’s iOS application profile.
The last three days involved undertaking readings
using the device’s Android application profile. The
medical information measured using each MIoT
device was as follows:
• Glucometer – blood sugar level
• Oximeter – oxygen level and pulse
• Scale – weight, body fat percentage, water
percentage, pulse, bone weight, muscle weight,
and the Body Mass Index value.
The device reading, as displayed on the MIoT
device interface, along with the date and time of
each reading, was documented for later analysis.
The Android hijacker smartphone was then
connected to the wireless network to gain access to
the Internet. The relevant MIoT applications were
then installed on the hijacker’s smartphone, using
the default installation and security parameters to
complete the installation. The MIoT smartphone
applications were executed on the hijacker
smartphone, and test profile accounts were created
for the experiment. After the profiles were created,
the hijacker smartphone applications were used to
‘search’ for the MIoT devices. When a MIoT
device was found, an attempt was made to ‘pair’ the
hijacker smartphone with the MIoT device. If the
pairing was successful, the hijacker’s smartphone
application was then prompted to ‘download’ any
available offline readings. This process was
repeated for all three MIoT applications.
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6. Immediately after the hijacker smartphone
attempted to ‘download’ the offline readings, the
smartphone contents were scrutinized using a
manual mobile phone forensics examination
technique [42]. This involved examining the MIoT
smartphone application interface to determine if the
victim’s medical information was visible through
the smartphone interface. The hijacker smartphone
was then processed using MSAB’s XRY (version
7.7) mobile forensic toolkit. The XRY toolkit was
used to create a forensic extraction of the
smartphone’s internal memory. A wizard provided
instructions on how to prepare the device for the
extraction. The hijacker’s smartphone internal
memory was then read, and a memory dump was
saved to a desktop folder on the forensic
workstation.
The
overall
process
took
approximately thirty-five minutes.
7. The forensic extractions were loaded into XRY’s
associated tool, XAMN (version 3.2), where the
Android file system was reconstructed. Several
digital forensic analysis techniques were then used
to locate files and artifacts related to MIoT
smartphone
applications. These
techniques
included: string searching, text filtering, and
browsing the respective file systems.
The scope of this research is restricted in the
following ways. The experiment was conducted in the
United States (US) using devices that contain network
software for carrier providers in the US. The MIoT
devices used in the experiment were acquired through
the manufacturer’s US-based website. The experiment
focused on a specific version of the Android and iOS
operating systems, specific versions of the MIoT
smartphone applications, and a specific version of
XRY and XAMN. Due to tool limitation, Android was
the sole operating system used for the hijacking
smartphone. The experiment was executed only once,
on each victim smartphone, with only one hijacking
smartphone device. It should also be noted that the
primary researcher was both a participant and a
researcher in the experiment.

made during this pairing process. From the perspective
of the glucometer, a hijacker can ‘pair’ the device with
their smartphone. First, the hijacker is prompted to
scan either white QR-coded or blue non-coded test
strips (Figure 1), before they can add the glucometer to
their profile. To bypass the above selection, a hijacker
can select the “non-coded strip” selection option. Next,
the hijacker is notified to confirm that the device is
powered-on and prompts the hijacker to turn on
Bluetooth capabilities on their smartphone. The
hijacker can then scan for nearby devices and selects
the glucometer by selecting the device name
“BG5xxxxxx”, in the Bluetooth menu. This allows the
hijacker to pair and connect their smartphone to the
glucometer.

Figure 1: Glucometer Strip Selection
After the pairing was successful, the hijacker is
presented with a screen, as shown in Figure 2,
prompting the upload of offline readings from the
victim glucometer.

4. Results and Analysis
This section presents an analysis of the hijacker and
the MIoT device pairing, as well as the results of the
manual and smartphone examinations.

4.1 Pairing of MIoT Devices and Hijacker
At a high-level, two of the MIoT devices (the
glucometer and the oximeter) were successfully added
to the hijacker’s profile. This holds true for both the
Android and iOS profiles. Several observations were

Figure 2: Glucometer Offline Readings
In terms of the oximeter, the hijacker is again
notified to confirm that the device is powered-on and
prompted to turn on Bluetooth capabilities on their
smartphone. The device setup guide then searches for
an oximeter nearby and then prompts the hijacker to
select any devices that have been found (Figure 3). A
Bluetooth connection between the hijacker and the
oximeter is established at this point.
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4.2 Hijack Device Examination
A summary of MIoT device recordings recovered
from the hijacker smartphone is available in Table 3 –
Summary of Results. Several observations are
derivable from these results. The analysis of the
hijacker smartphone confirmed initial observations: the
smartphone did not ‘pair’ with the scale. As a result, no
data from this MIoT device was visible on the
hijacker’s smartphone interface, nor recovered from
the smartphone’s memory using the forensic toolkit.

Glucometer:
Blood Sugar
Timestamp
Oximeter:
Oxygen Level
Pulse
Timestamp
Scale:
Weight
Body Fat
Body Water
Pulse
Bone Weight
Muscle Weight
BMI
Timestamp
Glucometer:
Blood Sugar
Timestamp
Oximeter:
Oxygen Level
Pulse
Timestamp
Scale:
Weight
Body Fat
Body Water
Pulse
Bone Weight
Muscle Weight
BMI
Timestamp

Day 3

The scale is the only MIoT device requiring the
hijacker to interact with the device physically, in order
to ‘pair’ with the hijacker’s smartphone. For this
device, the hijacker is required to push a button at the
front of the scale to turn on ‘broadcast mode’. After the
device is placed into this mode, the hijacker is notified
that a scale has been detected and the smartphone
application configures the device for use. However,
even after the hijacker is notified that the scale has
been successfully paired with the smartphone, they are
not prompted to upload any offline readings from the
device.

iOS

Figure 4: Oximeter Offline Readings

Device/Reading
Value

Day 2

OS

Android

The hijacker is then provided with the option to
take a new reading with the device or to upload any
offline data through the ‘Filter Data’ option, as shown
in Figure 4. Selecting this option provides the hijacker
with a list of all the offline readings that are currently
stored on the oximeter device.

Day 1

Figure 3: Oximeter Device Selection

However, an examination of the hijacker’s
smartphone revealed that medical information from the
glucometer and oximeter devices was recoverable. This
information included both Android and iOS application
profiles. Depending on the MIoT device, this
information is visible in either the smartphone’s
interface or the forensic extraction of the smartphone’s
internal memory. This information confirms the initial
assumption that the hijacker’s smartphone successfully
‘paired’ with the glucometer and oximeter devices.

M
M

M
M

M
M

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

M
M

M
M

M
M

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Key: ✓ = Recovered using manual and forensic
examination; M = Recovered using manual
examination only; X = Not recovered using manual or
forensic examination
Table 3: Summary of Results
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4.2.1 Manual Examination
A manual examination of the smartphone revealed
that the hijacker’s version of the Gluco-Smart and
MyVitals applications contained medical information
(i.e., device readings). Figure 5 – Glucometer Manual
Examination and Figure 6 – Oximeter Manual
Examination present the results of the manual
examination of these applications.
From the perspective of the glucometer, a hijacker
can potentially, view readings taken using the device in
the Gluco-Smart application. The information
recovered from the victim’s glucometer includes the
victim’s blood sugar level, along with the date and
time of the acquired reading.

Figure 5: Glucometer Manual Examination
Similarly, the manual examination of the MyVitals
application interface revealed that a hijacker could
view device readings from the oximeter device. This
application reports a victim’s pulse rate in beats per
minute, oxygen level, and each readings timestamp.

Figure 6: Oximeter Manual Examination

4.2.2 Forensic Image Examination
The analysis of the Android memory dumps
revealed a variety of artifacts related to the GlucoSmart and MyVitals applications. Artifacts related to
these applications can are located in different
subfolders under the location /data/ data/ in the
Android filesystem [16]. The location of specific
artifacts varies depending on the application under
investigation. Unless noted, all timestamps recovered
from the Android forensic extractions are recorded as
epoch timestamps.
The MyVitals application creates a folder called
iHealthMyVitals.V2,
which
is
stored

in
the
following
file
path
/data/data/iHealthMyVitals.V2.
This
folder contains artifacts related to the victim’s use of
the Air pulse oximeter. Within the high-level folder,
there is a Databases subfolder. This contains
various SQLite databases of potential interest. A
database called androidNin.db contains fiftyseven (57) tables, including three tables of data
relevant to the victim’s oximeter and the hijacker. A
table called TB_Device contains information about
the oximeter device, which has been subject to
interactions with the hijacker smartphone. Information
regarding the oximeter that is available in this table
includes the model number, the firmware version, and
the physical MAC address of the device. A second
table, which contains information related to the victim
oximeter, is called TB_Spo2OfflineResult. This
table contains the actual hijacked readings that the
victim undertook using the oximeter. Along with the
oximeter reading result, a hijacker can also obtain the
date and time the reading was acquired, the timezone
where the reading was taken, along with the MAC
address of the oximeter used by the victim.
A final table of interest is called TB_UserInfo.
This table contains information about the hijacker and
is likely to be of interest to an incident handler or
forensic investigator. This table contains the date of
birth, gender, height, and weight information as
provided by the hijacker when the hijacker’ MyVitals
profile was created. In addition to the information in
the database file, relevant information was also found
in several Extensible Markup Language (XML) files.
These XML files are stored in a subfolder called
shared_prefs, under the iHealthMyVitals.V2
parent folder. Within the shared_prefs, subfolder
the following files and information can be recovered,
related to the hijacker, their victim, and the interactions
between their devices:
• historyTime.xml – contains the MAC address
and timestamp information regarding the last
interaction between the hijacker’s smartphone
device and MIoT device.
• saveUserIDs.xml – contains the email
addresses used by the hijacker to register their
account with the iHealth service.
• saveDeviceId.xml – contains a list of the
MIoT devices, which the hijacker has successfully
accessed using this specific account. This includes
the MAC address of the victim devices.
• sp_connect_times_file.xml – contains
the number of times that the hijacker’s account has
been used to access a specific MIoT device. This
information includes the MAC address of the
device and the number of previous connections.
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• sp_user_region_host_info.xml
–
contains information about the hijacker including
their application account access token, a hash of
their password, along with the cloud host used to
access the iHealth services.
• device_id.txt.xml – contains the device
Universal Unique Identifier (UUID) of the
hijacker’s smartphone.
The Gluco-Smart application creates a folder called
jiuan.androidBg.start, which is stored under
the location /data/data/jiuan.androidBg.
start. This folder contains artifacts related to the
victim’s use of the Smart glucometer. While a database
called androidBG.db was recovered from a
subfolder called Database within the high-level
application folder, this database was encrypted. An
analysis of the other database files in the subfolder did
not reveal any information about the hijacker or the
victim devices. However, various XML files stored in
the shared_prefs subfolder provide detailed
information about the hijacker and their activities. The
following files and information can are recoverable
from this subfolder:
• USER_INFO.xml – the username (as an email
address) and the smartphones’ UUID that is used to
connect to the glucometer device.
• sp_user_region_host_info.xml
–
contains the hijacker’s email information, along
with the host used to access the iHealth services.
• sp_last_update_TS.xml – contains the
MAC address and timestamp information regarding
the last interaction between the hijacker’s
smartphone device and MIoT device, whose MAC
address is listed.
• sp_connect_times_file.xml – contains
the number of times that the hijacker’s account has
been used to access a specific MIoT device. This
information includes the MAC address of the
device and the number of previous connections.
• saveDeviceIdTS.xml – contains a list of the
MIoT devices, which the hijacker has successfully
accessed using this specific account. This includes
the MAC address of the victim devices.
• device_id.txt.xml – contains the device
UUID of the hijacker’s smartphone.

4.3 Analysis Summary and Limitations
The results described above can be used to provide
answers to the research questions proposed in Section
One. First, the analysis of the hijacker smartphone
revealed that the hijacking attacks on the victim MIoT

devices resulted in recoverable residual data on the
hijacker’s smartphone.
Second, the manual and forensic analysis of the
hijacker smartphone revealed that victim MIoT device
readings are recoverable through a hijacking attack.
The results of the manual examination have shown that
the hijacker’s smartphone application contains readings
from two (glucometer and oximeter) out of the three
victims MIoT devices. Moreover, the results from the
forensic examination of the hijacker’s smartphone
revealed that device readings from the oximeter are
recoverable from databases stored on the smartphone.
Third, in addition to recovering device readings, the
hijacker smartphone also contains a variety of metadata
related to the glucometer and oximeter. This metadata
includes device model numbers, firmware versions,
and MAC address information. While this information
is recoverable using a forensic extraction of the
hijacker’s smartphone, if the same smartphone has
been ‘rooted,’ a hijacker could potentially recover this
information using tools freely available on the Internet
at no cost. This information would be useful to an
attacker interested in potentially causing a denial of
service attack against MIoT devices [43].
While the results of the manual and forensic
examination of the hijacker’s smartphone revealed
information about the victim MIoT devices, minimal
information about the victim is recovered from this
experiment. However, previous research establishes
that an attacker can identify high-level device data
patterns based on residual data generated from a
variety of smartphone applications [19]. As a result, if
an attacker combines information about the victim
from other smartphone applications, coupled with the
intelligence gathered from the MIoT devices, highlevel data patterns are a possibility.
The overall analysis of the data partially supports
the hypothesis that MIoT devices are susceptive to
hijacking attacks through their accompanying
smartphone applications. The hypothesis statement is
true for two out of the three MIoT devices evaluated in
this research. This statement holds true for both the
Android and iOS application profiles on these devices.
The data intercepted by a potential attacker could be
used to commit further attacks or augment user profile
development.
While the analysis demonstrates that it is possible
to launch a hijacking attack against a MIoT device, the
following assumptions and limitations must be
acknowledged. First, it is assumed that the hijacker is
within proximity to the MIoT device. This is required
to maintain a Bluetooth connection. However, due to
the mobility feature of MIoT devices, this is not
implausible as victims may use these devices in public
places such as airports, libraries and coffee shops.
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Second, this method of attack is relevant while the
device manufacturer does not implement a verification
mechanism, such as the approach used in the scale. If
physical access to the MIoT device is needed to enable
a feature or to push a button, then the hijacking attack
is invalided using the proposed attack model. Third,
the attack model is successful because the victim is not
prompted to confirm if a particular smartphone can
connect and receive information from the MIoT
device. If a manufacturer enables such a feature, the
victim will be prompted that a malicious hijacker is
attempting to connect to a device and the hijacker’s
smartphone does not successfully ‘pair’ with the MIoT
device.

5. Conclusion and Future Work
The amalgamation of the Internet of things (IoT)
devices into medical scenarios creates an atmosphere
that is conducive to a variety of attacks. The results of
this proof of concept research support the hypothesis
that medical IoT devices are susceptible to hijacking
attacks. The data demonstrates that it is possible to
launch a successful hijacking attack against a Medical
IoT (MIoT) device. This attack, potentially, allows an
attacker to gather information about the MIoT device
user, as well as the device itself. This intelligence
could then be combined with other smartphone data to
develop detailed profiles about the individual,
including the identification of potential health issues.
Moreover, the intelligence gathered from a MIoT
device could also be used to launch denial of service
attacks against similar devices. Such attacks on
medical devices can be especially problematic in an
emergency scenario.
Future research will examine several key areas.
This research will expand to include diverse MIoT
devices and associated smartphone applications. The
focus of this experiment is to evaluate the results from
this initial investigation on a larger scale. Further
research also needs to examine MIoT smartphone
applications from the perspective of multiple operating
systems. Future work will explore the idea of
automating the attacks described in this paper, along
with other vulnerabilities in MIoT devices. This
automation then allows for the development of a test
environment that will assist with the interrogation of
medical devices and the development of potential
secure mitigation strategies.
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